

~~TOP SECRET~~REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20310

DAMI-ZA

18 January 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Reaction to Your Observations on Military Intelligence
in Europe (U)

1. (S) MG Ted Atkeson gave me a list of military intelligence issues you noted [redacted] and asked for a response. I offer my personal reaction to each, not a staffed Army or DOD position.

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2. (S) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols

a. We need such a capability badly. Army commanders in Europe emphasize this point every year. One of the most compelling arguments for LRRPs is the European weather analysis. It shows that only LRRPs provide an all-weather capability in an environment that will prevent aerial collection platforms and national systems from collecting a majority of the days each year.

b. The Army is working to find the manpower for LRRPs, but the trade-offs are painful. I believe we will pay the price for LRRPs and support a program for them in the near future. The issue is related to the allocation of roles and missions for Rangers and Special Forces, and it has yet to be fully resolved.

3. (S) Correlation of Reconnaissance Sensor Reports

a. I presume this refers to LOCE, the European deployment of BETA.

b. We need ADP support for intelligence all-source fusion. I am not sanguine, however, that LOCE is an effective approach, even if greatly modified. The problem is in the software logic of sensor report correlations by ADP only. I investigated this matter in some detail last fall and concluded that we are trying to "square a circle." BETA front-end software can never, in my view, be fixed so that the machine can tell unambiguously whether it has received a report of the same thing

ARMY review completed.

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from two or more sensors or two different things. This difficulty has led to large amounts of money spent on software with no significant progress.

c. Some of the BETA software is salvageable, but the LOCE experience in Europe is unlikely to identify the useful applications. That will be done, if at all, by the new Joint Tactical Fusion Program now beginning under the guidance of Under Secretary of the Army Ambrose and the Air Force.

4. (S) ELINT Management in Wartime

a. I presume here you are referring to EUDAC in Stuttgart.

b. EUDAC's wartime role is unclear to me. In peacetime, it performs useful S&T work as well as liaison with our NATO allies. In wartime, if EUDAC disappeared, the impact on the Army would be minimal. I cannot speak for the Air Force or Navy.

5. (TS) Dissemination of Sensitive HUMINT

a. The Army does this through my office's Red Team which closely scrutinizes sensitive HUMINT from all sources. The Red Team, without explaining why to Army users, particularly in ADP models for force analysis, threat development, etc., ensures that applicable sensitive intelligence is taken into account in all our "threat" work.

b. Occasionally, an issue like the Operational Maneuver Group, is pulled out, corroborated by other sources, and disseminated widely to Army commanders.

6. (TS) U.S. Ground Intelligence Support to ACE

a. I am sure you saw the DCSI USSAREUR system for providing such support during exercises. My own view is that the Army should provide a full-time intelligence presence in the AFCENT Tactical Fusion Center. That would allow a better Army-Air Force development of collection management and I&W support to AFCENT.

b. I intend to discuss this with BG(P) Parker in the near future.

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c. There may be an effective tie between NATO and CINCUSAREUR for crisis periods, such as Poland presented recently, but I am not fully aware of it.

d. General Meyer has made several efforts to develop a peacetime system of intelligence daily reporting up the NATO channel to CINCAFCENT. I am pushing his case as often as opportunities permit.

7. (U) Thank you for the opportunity to comment on these matters.

Wm E Odom

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ACofS for Intelligence

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